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Abstract
In December 2008, as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis continued on its devastating
course, a new scandal erupted. After the 1998's failure of Long-Term Capital Management,
Madoff's fraud once again discredits the hedge funds industry. This scandal is however of
a diﬀerent kind. Indeed, Madoff's ﬁrm is not a standard hedge fund but a developed Ponzi
scheme. By explaining Madoff's system and exploring the reasons for its collapse, this paper
draws risk management lessons from this fraud, especially for operational risk management.
Present day risk management processes have partially failed to prevent the Madoff scandal.
This paper presents the issues for risk capital requirements raised by the collapse of the
Madoff scheme. Implications for due diligence processes, including the use of quantitative
replication to assess the credibility of the performance of a hedge fund, are also considered.
Finally, consideration is given to the regulatory and standardizing approaches of the hedge
fund industry as a response to frauds similar to that of Madoff.
Keywords: Madoff fraud, Ponzi scheme, operational risk, due diligence, supervision, hedge
funds, bull spread strategy, split strike conversion.
JEL classiﬁcation: G1, G3.
In December 2008, as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis continued on its devastating course,
a new scandal bursts. On the night of the 11th, from Thursday to Friday, the 12th of December,
a ﬁnancial fraud amounting to up to US$ 50 billion is uncovered through the confession of its
perpetrator: the ﬁnancier Bernard L. Madoff. Needless to say, the unprecedented scope of the
fraud is beyond the reach of other recent scandals of the ﬁnancial system  a system in such a
bad shape that it prompted President-elect Barack Obama to say on December 18th that we fell
asleep at the wheel. On this occasion, we ﬁnd ourselves facing a swindle whose origins are at least
as old as the idea of a stock exchange. The system developed by Madoff's ﬁrm, commonly known
as a Ponzi scheme, was pyramidal in the sense that the returns on investment of yesterday's
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investors were paid out of the deposits of today's investors rather than the true product of their
investments. The system went on for years, however with the advent of the ﬁnancial crisis, several
of Madoff's customers asked to withdraw their capital provoking the collapse of the entire scheme.
In a way, this series of events once again substantiates Warren Buffet's famous aphorism1: it's
only when the tide goes out that you see who has been swimming naked.
How can the extent of this con be explained then at a time of high technologies, coercive
rules in risk management and the immediate diﬀusion of information? In the words of Alan
Greenspan, risk management involves judgment as well as science, and the science is based on
the past behavior of markets, which is not an infallible guide to the future. Certainly, he is
right, but today, the past provides us with a formidable occasion to improve our guide to the
future. For this reason, if justiﬁable charges exist against the diﬀerent actors (including both
the system and the science), we believe one must seize the occasion and scientiﬁcally improve
the system. The inquiry into the system's failure and the circumstances that lead to it must go
beyond accusations of dysfunction. It needs a scientiﬁc demonstration of how the system failed,
and what necessary consequences must be drawn to avoid future scandals.
In 1998 already, the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management aﬀair had helped to point out
the failings of market risk management. Philippe Jorion [28] had thus proposed a very interesting
reading of LTCM's failure (see also Edwards [14]). Madoff's fraud further highlights the failure
of operational risk management. More precisely, it illustrates the failure of the quantitative
measures used in the management of this risk by the asset management industry  a risk which is
perhaps underestimated since asset management ﬁrms are considered by the Basel Committee as
low risk activities. This paper can thus be understood as building on these previous contributions
to the improvement of risk management by the asset management industry. Next, we provide
the plan of the paper.
In section 1, we clarify the primary reasons which allowed Madoff's system to operate for
several years. In section 2, we explore Madoff's ﬁrm strategy by showing ﬁrstly how diﬃcult and
nearly impossible it is to replicate its advertised strategy, and secondly, the fundamental reasons
behind the scheme's collapse in December 2008 through a detailed analysis of the mechanism of a
Ponzi scheme. In section 3, we build on these investigations to draw new lessons for operational
risk capital requirements. Finally, in section 4, we unravel the implications of Madoff's fraud for
the regulators and the investment industry.
1 The story
According to the title of an article [13] in The Economist from December 20th, 2008, the
scheme revealed on December 12th is the con of the century. How and why was Bernard Leon
Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), Madoff's ﬁrm, presented as one of the most respectable
and irreproachable ﬁrms, able to originate and sustain such a scheme remains even now somewhat
puzzling. In this section, we review the mechanism of the fraud, before exposing some of the
reasons thought to underpin the success of Madoff's scheme.
1Allegedly, Warren Buffet [33] added in August 2008: Wall Street has been kind of a nudist beach.
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1.1 Mechanism of the fraud
This ﬁnancial scandal is not the work of quantitative speculators building complex ﬁnancial
products, of which buyers have little understanding, as was the case with the subprime crisis2
and many of the products resulted from the process called securitization. It is not either the result
of the clever stratagem of some dishonest trader trying to avoid controls to invest more than
is reasonable. No, this con of the century, on the level of Luxembourg's GDP, stemmed from
one of the simplest and one of the oldest embezzling schemes: a Ponzi scheme. Bhattacharya [7]
dates its origin back to the scandal of Scotsman John Law's Compagnie des Indes in France in
1719. However, the ﬁnancier who gave his name, Charles Ponzi, went to jail in 1920 for having
swindled approximately 40,000 of his customers. His idea was simple. Advertising an investment
strategy relying on the arbitrage of international mail coupons between Italy and the USA, he
promised a 50% return on investment in 90 days to his investors. In truth, he used the capital
invested by his newest investors to pay high and quasi-insured returns to his older ones. The
depreciations of his investments were then ﬁlled by the contributions of the new customers. The
scheme lasted for approximated six months before it was uncovered.
To be fair, there exist many kinds of Ponzi schemes not all of which are fraudulent (see e.g.
Bhattacharya [7]). Almost every country uses some form of a Ponzi scheme. When rolling-over
their debt, states are indeed asking new lenders for the sum they need to pay-oﬀ their previous
lenders. This insures against short-term shocks. At the state level, especially in the case of rich
countries, this technique is viable because the default risk is negligible. Yet, when it is a ﬁrm
such as BMIS and when credit facilities become scarce, then it is a serious collapse.
Besides its simplicity, one of the puzzling issues of Madoﬀ's fraud is the proﬁle of its vic-
tims. Those are not simple individuals disconnected from the ﬁnancial markets and its remote
mechanisms. On the contrary, they are, for the most part, investors who presumably have an
expert knowledge of the trade of ﬁnancial investment: rich private individuals and large ﬁnancial
institutions3. The conception of such a system, which operated for certainly more than 15 years,
while Ponzi was able to swindle for only 6 months at a time when new information technologies
were non-existent and the training of investors far less developed, seems today incomprehensible.
It happened nonetheless. In the following, we contend that the three core tenets to the existence
of this fraud are: Madoﬀ's reputation; a high and attractive performance; and the concurrent
holding of several positions which facilitated the implementation of Madoﬀ's system.
1.2 Madoff's reputation
The ﬁrst reason explaining the fraud is the reputation of its mastermind which inspired great
conﬁdence to its investors. To understand its origins, it is necessary to go back over the biography
of this 70-year-old man. Swimming instructor on Long Island, Madoff created his investment
ﬁrm at the age of 22 with only $ 5,000 of his personal savings. His following success consequently
embodied the American dream and provided Madoff with the aura of a great ﬁnancier. Moreover,
he was president of the NASDAQ, in 1990-1991, an institution which he reformed in depth to
become one of the most successful stock exchanges. Madoff was also a philanthropist who founded
2The subprime crisis was caused by the sudden illiquidity of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) built on the debt
of some American households which had obtained mortgage loans unreasonable for their incomes.
3A list of Madoff's victims compiled by the Wall Street Journal on January 28, 2008 is available at http:
//s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_madoff_victims_20081215.html
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the Madoff Family Foundation. His ethics was praised by many, and many of his investors were
charity organizations. In January 2008, his ﬁrm even claimed on its website that Madoff himself
had a personal interest in maintaining the unblemished record of value, fair-dealing, and high
ethical standards that has always been the ﬁrm's hallmark. The personal reputation of its
founder is not, however, the only factor of the incredible success of this scheme. Being registered
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and passing without incident the various
inquiries made by the regulator of American ﬁnance could only inspire conﬁdence in BMIS
and contributed to reinforce its credibility. Thus, one of the ﬁrst reasons to explain Madoff
fraud ensued from the irrational behavior of the agents who based their investment decisions
not on some scientiﬁc study but on the reputation of the fund's manager4. Perhaps, some of
his customers were informed of Madoff's scheme, but it seems as certain that, given their large
number, all were not informed. It illustrates that there will always be sheep to be shorn as
Charles Kindleberger wrote [30]. In ﬁnancial markets, conﬁdence and reputation remain essential
factors to understand the mechanisms of a fraudulent Ponzi scheme as well as those leading to
the development of a speculative bubble.
1.3 A highly attractive performance
The second reason we ﬁnd behind the success of Madoff's fraud is the attraction that Madoff's
performance must have had on investors. Given its performance, we could even be astonished
by the fact that this fraud is not more impressive. Two opposed reasons can explain this: ﬁrst
of all, due diligence processes (we will describe these more precisely in section 4.1) have put
Madoff's funds into black lists; the second reason is due to Madoff himself. Indeed, Madoff
had introduced a hard and cruel selection for new customers to invest in his funds: they must
have the authorization of Madoff. It permits to assert his talent and to lure new customers who
thought that they are specially selected thanks to their own characteristics.
Since Madoff's performance is not public information, we used the following 6 funds, all
known feeders of Madoff's fund to proxy and understand his performance: Fairﬁeld Sentry Ltd
(FFS), Kingate Global Fund Ltd (KING), Optimal Strategic US Equity Ltd (OPTI), Santa
Clara I Fund (SANTA), LuxAlpha Sicav - American Selection (LUX) and Herald Fund SPC
- USA Segregated Portfolio One (HRLD). Their characteristics are reported in Table 1. The
study period begins in January 31th, 1990 and ends in October 31st, 2008. Notice their absolute
yearly rates of returns close to the 10% mark for relatively low corresponding volatility leading
to uncannily high Sharpe ratios, at least 5 times greater that the S&P500's. Of the 156 months
of data available to us for the FFS feeder fund, only 5 months exhibit a negative performance.
Besides, Madoff's management fees were non-existent: Madoff claimed that the fees perceived on
the trading deals via his broker's activities were amply suﬃcient. He told his customers he was
letting them in to share in the beneﬁts of his expertise in securities valuation. Like Ponzi in 1920,
the so-called arbitrage was at the heart of the performance. These phenomenal performances,
clearly visible on a classic portfolio optimization display (cf. Figure 2), were nevertheless often
called into question because of their weak volatility. They are indeed very smooth (cf. Figure
1).
BMIS performances should be very similar to those of these six feeder funds. It is no wonder
then that Madoff could attract the unaware or the no-so-attentive investors. But, what could
4We refer to [27] for more details on how Madoff operates.
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Figure 1: Comparison of funds invested in Madoff with traditional asset classes
Table 1: Statistics of funds invested in Madoff
µˆ1Y is the annualized performance, σˆ1Y the yearly volatility, s the Sharpe ratio, γ1 the skewness and γ2 the excess kurtosis.
D1M, D3M and D6M are respectively the drawdown for one, three and six months and Dmax is the maximum drawdown
over the entire period. H is the hit ratio of monthly positive returns. All statistics are expressed in percents, except for the
statistics s, γ1 and γ2.
UST S&P 500 HFRI FFS KING OPTI SANTA LUX HRLD
µˆ1Y 6.68 8.52 12.42 11.24 11.56 10.96 14.19 8.29 7.27
σˆ1Y 6.80 14.28 7.08 3.81 4.71 2.69 4.63 1.53 1.69
s 0.33 0.28 1.10 1.75 1.47 2.48 2.26 2.73 1.87
γ1 -0.32 -0.76 -0.81 4.70 6.14 0.87 1.06 0.48 0.53
γ2 0.74 1.79 2.99 39.96 59.70 0.27 2.07 0.07 0.24
D1M -7.09 -16.80 -8.70 -0.55 -2.30 -0.39 -1.87 -0.19 -0.37
D3M -8.52 -23.11 -13.60 -0.17 -4.53 -0.64 -1.89 0.85 0.56
D6M -8.83 -29.28 -15.14 0.75 -4.72 0.26 -0.79 2.50 1.85
Dmax -10.62 -44.73 -18.13 -0.55 -5.54 -0.64 -2.01 -0.19 -0.37
H 64.65 64.65 73.49 93.37 92.22 91.43 74.75 98.18 88.89
5
Figure 2: Portfolio optimization
be said of the professional hedge fund managers who fed funds to the scheme? Once again, the
point here is not to blindly attack managers about some alleged investment decisions, but rather
to point out that by surﬁng on the alternative investments' trend of these last years, Madoff has
further blackened the image of an industry often characterized by its lack of transparency (see
e.g. [36]). Indeed, in the recent ﬁnancial climate, this fraud cannot but stress the need for urgent
regulatory change. We shall examine this issue in section 4.
1.4 Holding several posts concurrently: broker, fund manager and custodian
The ﬁnal explanation we will give to explain the unhindered development of the fraud is the
fact that BMIS was concurrently a broker, a fund manager and also the custodian of its funds.
Conversely to what is practiced in Europe (cf. the European Undertakings for Collective In-
vestment in Transferable Securities or UCITS III), American regulations do not prohibit an
asset management ﬁrm to be the custodian of its own managed funds. In the European Product
Directive it is stipulated, for the safekeeping of assets, that:
The depositary must act independently of the other parties to the UCITS and solely
in the interest of the unit-holders.
To understand the potential conﬂicts of interest, one needs only to look at the structure of
Madoff's fraud. Among Madoff's customers, one must ﬁrst separate prominent billionaires,
universities and charity organizations from ﬁnancial institutions. The latter can be large banks,
which lent money to hedge funds which then placed it either directly at BMIS or, more often
than not, invested it in feeder funds. Feeder funds are structures which collect capital from
banks, hedge funds and rich private individuals to entrust them to a fund manager  in this
case Madoff. They are thus intermediaries and distributors. They can be classiﬁed into two
categories:
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1. Oﬀshore ﬁrms of average size and of Luxembourgian or also Irish right, among them: Fair-
ﬁeld Greenwich Group with Fairﬁeld Sentry fund ($ 7.5 billion); Tremont Capital Manage-
ment ($ 3.1 billion); Kingate Management with Kingate Global Fund ($ 2.8 billion); Ascot
Partners ($ 1.8 billion); and, Access International Advisors ($ 1.5 billions in LuxAlpha).
These ﬁrms are generally opaque and base their clientele on an extensive network.
2. Large banks managing funds of hedge funds (FoHF) including for example: Santander
Optimal (2.33 billion euros), Union Bancaire Privée (796 millions euros), etc. What is
marketed by these managers is the solidity of the balance sheet and the system of controls
via due diligence processes.
Madoff operated mostly as a fund manager by delegation of funds obtained through these
distributors. Although, these latter had large international banks as custodians (UBS for Lux-
Alpha, HSBC for Thema), these institutions also delegated to Madoﬀ the custody of the assets
of the managed funds. Thus, in the end, Madoﬀ was the manager and the custodian of his own
funds by means of this double delegation. The fraudulent scheme thus largely beneﬁted from
lesser scrutiny since the control over the management or the custody of the assets all remained
in BMIS's house.
Notwithstanding, while under the French law (ARIA 3), the independence of the manager
from the custodian of the assets (who is obligated to restore assets in case of failure, while it is
only an obligation of supervision in the Anglo-Saxon world) is mandatory for a hedge fund to
be eligible to inclusion in a fund of hedge funds's portfolio, according to the French Autorité des
Marchés Financiers  the French regulator, counterpart to the American SEC  some of French
managed funds were aﬀected by the collapse of Madoff's scheme. Disregarding the independence
rule normally raises a red ﬂag in the due diligence process. We are therefore facing a failure of
the system. The question we shall ask in section 4 is whether new laws must be promulgated
or whether a stricter enforcement of those really existing already would be suﬃcient to prevent
future scandals.
2 How Madoff lost the capital
One frequently asked question is: how could Madoff lose US$ 50 billion? At ﬁrst sight, this
seems impossible and incredible. One could think that it suﬃces to invest the capital at the
risk-free rate in order to easily cover redemptions except in the case where they are very large.
In fact, we will show in this section that this is not true, and we estimate that a ﬁgure of 20%
of redemptions in November is suﬃcient to explain Madoff's default. But before explaining the
collapse of Madoff, we ﬁrst present the alleged investment strategy sold by Madoff.
2.1 Understanding the Madoff investment strategy
Madoff used a strategy called Split Strike Conversions or Bull-Spread. This strategy is con-
stituted by three positions: a long position on the risky asset St, a short position on the call
option C (KC) and and a long position on the put option P (KP ) with KP < KC . The reader
can ﬁnd in Bernard and Boyle [6] a comprehensive study of the strategy. We also present in
Appendix A some results on this strategy. We report here a backtest of this strategy since March
1994 on S&P 500 using a monthly rebalancing frequency. We consider symmetric strikes, that
is KC = (1 + κ)S0 and KP = (1− κ)S0 using the at-the-money (ATM) volatility to price the
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options5. We reported the results in Figure 3. First, notice that the backtests are very far
from the performance of the FFS feeder fund. Second, remark that the Bull-Spread strategy
with κ = 1% or κ = 2% produces higher volatility than FFS. To give you an idea, to match
the volatility of FSS and our backtest, one has to use κ = 0.65%. In this case, however, the
performance of the Bull-Spread strategy would be close to the Libor's. In Figure 4, we reported
the scatterplot of returns of FFS, S&P 500 and our backtests. Note that the monthly returns of
FFS are not correlated with the monthly returns of S&P 500 nor with these of our backtests. In
order to reconcile the FFS performance with our backtest, one has to assume that Madoﬀ has a
good stock picking process. For example, if we consider that the stock picking process generates
an out-performance of 8.5% by year, we obtain a backtest with similar returns on average6 (see
Figure 5). But if the impressive returns obtained by Madoﬀ are explained by his stock selection
process (or by market timing), one may wonder why Madoﬀ did not launch a pure L/S equity
fund instead of a complex derivatives strategy. Notice also that the previous analysis and back-
test have been certainly done by some quants and explain why Madoﬀ was on the blacklist of
some banks, hedge funds or ﬁnancial institutions. In a recent paper, Bernard and Boyle [6] draw
the same conclusion: Madoﬀ's returns lie well outside their theoretical bounds and should have
raised suspicious about Madoﬀ's performance.
Figure 3: Backtest of the Bull-Spread strategy on S&P 500 index
2.2 Explaining the collapse of Madoff
We show here that the collapse of Madoff is mainly due to the liquidity crisis on hedge funds.
Using the data of the six Madoff feeder funds (which represents an amount of 15.5 US$ billion),
we estimate that a ﬁgure of 20% of redemptions in November suﬃces to explain the collapse of
Madoff.
5We do not take into account smile eﬀects meaning that our results are more favorable than in real life.
6Note that it has nevertheless 30% more volatility.
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Figure 4: Comparison of monthly returns
Figure 5: Introducing stock picking in the Bull-Spread strategy
9
Consider the Ponzi scheme framework developed in Appendix B. In order to estimate the net
ﬂows rate δt = λ+t − λ−t , we describe the net asset value Vt and the assets under management Ft
using the following system of equations{
dVt = µtVt dt
dFt = µtFt dt+
(
λ+t − λ−t
)
Ft dt
Combining the two equations, one obtains
δt dt =
dFt
Ft
− dVt
Vt
After estimating δit for each fund i, one may compute the amount ∆t of net ﬂows by
∆t =
6∑
i=1
∫ t
0
δitF
i
t dt
We have reported δit and d∆t in Figure 6. Notice the large outﬂows since the end of August. In
September, our estimate shows an amount of outﬂows of US$ 240 millions, while the estimate for
October is about US$790 millions. Thus, for these two months, the amount of redemption is at
least bigger than one billion dollars. This ﬁgure may nevertheless not explain Madoff's collapse
by itself.
Figure 6: Estimating the net ﬂows rate δt and the monthly net ﬂows amount d∆t
Madoff defaulted because there were no more capital in the end. Of course, the main reason
is redemptions. But we must also take into account the fees. Let us note Gt the gross asset
value. To obtain the net asset value Vt, we have to consider the management fees mt and the
performance fees pt. Because management fees are senior on performance fees, we proceed in
two steps.
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1. First, we compute G?t by subtracting the management fees
dG?t = dGt −mt dt
2. Second, we deduce the net asset value by subtracting the performance fees in the following
way
Vt = Vt• ×
(
G?t
G?t•
− pt ×
(
G?t
G?t•
− Bt
Btk
)+)
where t• = tp (t) is the last settlement date of performance fees before t. For example, if we
assume that the performance fees are paid at the end of each year, t• is equal to 31/12/2007
if t is October 31st, 2008. Bt is the value of the benchmark, and we take performance fees
only if the strategy has a return bigger than the benchmark's one.
Given a sequence of {Gt}T0 , we may deﬁne the historical series of net asset value {Vt}T0 . But
the reverse is also true. Given the {Vt}T0 , we may estimate {Gt}T0 by iterations. We may also
estimate the amount of fees generated by the fund
Wt =
∫ t
0
(
dGt
Gt
− dVt
Vt
)
Ft
In order to clearly understand how we proceed, consider the feeder fund FFS in Figure 7. The
top-left graph represents its net asset value. Using mt = 1%, pt = 20% and Bt = 1 (performance
fees are paid if the fund has a return above zero), we deduce the gross asset value in the top-right
graph. Using the assets under managements (bottom-left), we ﬁnally compute the total fees Wt.
Thus, we estimate for example that the total fees generated by FFS between January 2003 and
October 2008 is about 900 millions dollars.
Figure 7: An example of fees computing
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Figure 8: Estimating the gap in November 2008
Let's now consider our Ponzi scheme model. Assuming that rt = 0 and K0 = 0, the value of
the capital for the 6 funds is then
Kt = ∆t −Wt =
6∑
i=1
∫ t
0
δitF
i
t dt−
6∑
i=1
∫ t
0
(
dGit
Git
− dV
i
t
V it
)
F it
In Figure 8, we reported ∆t and Wt. Starting in January 2003, we estimate ∆t at about US$
4.3 billions, while Wt is around US$ 1.5 billions7. These fees do not, however, include Madoff's
remuneration and other expensive fees. If we add .50% of hidden fees, the estimated fees to
pay out of the assets under management between January 2003 and October 2008 for the six
funds is US$ 1.9 billions. The remaining capital in October 2008 is also estimated at US$ 2.4
billions dollars, which represent 15% of assets under management. Of course, this number is
certainly underestimated (because rt > 0 and K0 > 0). It gives nonetheless an idea of the cause
of Madoff's failure. In November 2008, because of the Hf liquidity crisis, Madoff certainly had to
face a big amount of redemptions (perhaps higher than 20%), but he had not enough capital to
pay them. Without the HF crisis of October 2008, Madoff's Ponzi scheme could certainly have
continued a long time.
Another interesting thing of note is that the main contributor to Madoff's default is the
LuxAlpha Sicav fund. By leaving the hedge funds' world and entering the European UCITS III
format, and therefore providing liquidity to its investors, it dragged Bernard Madoff in a position
where he could not face up to the liquidity crisis. Had he stayed in a hedge fund format and had
he applied a gate, Madoff could have perhaps not avoided the default, but would have certainly
survived longer.
7The numbers presented here are purely illustrative. Note that they only concern the assets of the six feeder
funds and not the entire wealth managed by Madoff.
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3 New lessons for operational risk capital requirements
The Madoff fraud concerns the operational risk. More precisely, depending on the relationship
between Madoff and the victim institution, it may be classiﬁed into diﬀerent Basel II event type
categories (cf. Table 2):
• Some ﬁnancial institutions have launched or distributed Madoff feeder funds.
 In case of internal complicity within the ﬁnancial institution, it then clearly classiﬁes
as a type 1 risk. That is an internal fraud.
 In case of no internal complicity, it is an external fraud. It also concerns ﬁnancial
institutions that have a direct exposure to Madoff funds.
• Finally, some ﬁnancial institutions will certainly choose to compensate their clients for
Madoff-related losses because of potential mis-selling or advisory failures. In this case, the
loss is a type 4 risk. That is, the loss may be classiﬁed into clients, products & business
practices.
Table 2: The loss event type classiﬁcation in Basel II
Event-Type Category (Level 1)
1 Internal fraud
2 External fraud
3 Employment practices and workplace safety
4 Clients, products & business practices
5 Damage to physical assets
6 Business disruption and system failures
7 Execution, delivery & process management
Making the diﬀerence between internal and external fraud is easy. However, making the diﬀerence
between external fraud and clients, products, & business practice is more diﬃcult when the
ﬁnancial institution has launched products related to Madoff funds. Let us consider the example
of Banco Santander. The Spanish bank has distributed the Optimal Strategic hedge fund to their
private banking and institutional clients. At the end of January, Banco Santander announced
that it was oﬀering its private banking clients 1.38 billion euros in compensation for Madoff-
related losses. From the point of view of Banco Santander, it represents an external fraud. But,
it is also a loss which pertains to a type 4 event deﬁned as follows:
Losses arising from an unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional obli-
gation to speciﬁc clients (including ﬁduciary and suitability requirements), or from
the nature or design of a product.
3.1 A new beta for the asset management industry?
In Basel II, capital must be used to cover for operational risk. In the Standardized Approach,
banks' activities are divided into eight business lines presented in Table 3. The capital charge
for each business line is calculated by multiplying the gross income by a factor assigned to that
business line and denoted beta. For the Asset Management line, the beta coeﬃcient is ﬁxed to
13
12%. For example, for a gross income of US$ 1 Bn, the yearly capital charge for operational risk
is US$ 120 Mns.
Table 3: The SA approach in Basel II
Business Line β factor
Corporate ﬁnance 18%
Trading and sales 18%
Retail banking 12%
Commercial banking 15%
Payment and settlement 18%
Agency services 15%
Asset management 12%
Retail brokerage 12%
Notice that Asset Management is classiﬁed as a low operational risk category along with
Retail Banking and Retail Brokerage. To understand why, it is best to reﬂect on how Basel II
was calibrated some years ago. In January 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(henceforth BCBS) published the second consultative paper [2] and proposed to add capital
for operational risk. During 2001, BCBS conducted two major data collection exercises called
Quantitative Impact Study: QIS 2 and QIS 2.5. The results for operational risk were published
in January 2002 [4] and in March 2003 [5]. In September 2001, BCBS released a new working
paper on operational risk [3]. In this new paper, one can already ﬁnd the overall framework for
operational risk of Basel II. In particular, it contains some results on collected loss data. Using
diﬀerent ranking schemes, it appears that Retail Banking tends to be ranked low, while Trading
and Sales, Payment and Settlement, and Agency Services and Custody tend to be ranked high.
On average, Asset Management comes in fourth position8. Using these data, Moscadelli (2004)
[35] calibrated the betas and found that Asset Management comes in third position (see Table
14 in [35]). In the third Consultative Paper published in April 2003, BCBS conﬁrmed a low beta
of 12% for Asset Management.
The reaction of the Asset Management industry was generally positive as exempliﬁed by the
letter of the European Asset Management Association dated from January 29, 2003.
We accept the need for investment management ﬁrms to hold a minimum amount
of regulatory capital, but remain of the view, which is supported by the 2001 EAMA
Study [19], that the business of investment management does not pose the same
systemic risk issues as banking, and that regulatory capital should not be the principal
safeguard against operational risk.
They therefore proposed the reinforcement of risk management principles in Asset Management
(as in the UCITS III directive), but suggested a maximum capital charge of 10 million Euros.
Similar conclusions may be found in the report [10].
In June 2008, BCBS initiated a new Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE). The results are
not yet known, but we could ask ourselves whether there is need for a new beta for the Asset
8from less risky to more risky business lines.
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Management line, especially after Madoff and similar frauds (one could think also of the alleged
twin scandal to Madoff's perpetrated by Robert Allen Stanford's ﬁrms and revealed on February
17, 2009) which would not be integrated in the LDCE results. One must notice that this new
LDCE will certainly show that operational risks have increased since the last LDCE, but most
probably because of the ﬁnancial crisis for most business lines. What about the asset management
industry in particular? Conspicuously, the Asset Management category has not suﬀered from
more operational risk losses than Trading & Sales. Nonetheless, one may think that the Madoff
scandal should negatively impact the new beta for Asset Management relatively to the Retail
Banking category, because the ﬁnancial crisis reveals a riskier behavior of the asset management
industry essentially due to the use of complex ﬁnancial instruments and vehicles, like Madoff's
funds. But the reality is more complex because Private Banking is generally classiﬁed in the
Retail Banking category and not in the Asset Management category. In this case, BCBS has
several options to redeﬁne the SA approach:
• ﬁrst, it may do nothing considering that Madoff fraud was already taken into account by
the existing betas;
• second, it may conduct a new LDCE in order to measure the impact of Madoff fraud and
revise the existing betas;
• ﬁnally, it may modify the business lines classiﬁcation by creating a Private Banking cate-
gory.
Anyway, the problem is set to BCBS, which will certainly conduct a new LDCE to measure the
impact of the Madoff fraud in terms of operational risk.
3.2 Impact on Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) capital
According to Basel II, supervisors may authorize a bank to compute its capital charge using an
internal model. In general, this model is based on the Loss Distribution Approach [17, 18]. In
this approach, the operational risk loss for one business line and one risk type is deﬁned by
L =
N∑
n=0
`n
where N is the number of losses for the next year and {`1, . . . , `N} are the amounts of the
individual losses. In LDA, it is assumed that N is drawn from a yearly frequency distribution
F, and `n are i.i.d. random variates from the severity distribution G. The distribution H of L
is then obtained as the convolution of G by F. The capital charge is therefore computed as the
quantile of H at the 99.9% conﬁdence level:
CaR (α) = H−1 (α) = inf {x | G (x) ≥ α}
with α = 99.9%.
When a bank faces a big loss, it has no impact on the frequency distribution F but may have
a big impact on the estimation of the severity distribution G. In this case, the distribution H
will change accordingly, and the computed capital charge will be very diﬀerent with respect to
past years. Thus, banks exposed to the Madoff fraud will certainly have to compute additional
capital under the Advanced Measurement Approach.
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Let us consider an example. Assume that `n and N are respectively distributed according
to a log-normal LN (7, 2.5) and a Poisson distribution P20. The capital charge CaR for this
business line and this event type is about US$ 19 Mns. Let us suppose that a big loss occurs for
this business line and this event type, e.g. US$ 100 Mns. We can compute the impact of this
big loss on the new capital charge CaR∗. If we assume the use of a database of 5 years length
to estimate the severity distribution, we can compute the ratio CaR∗ /CaR. The density of this
ratio is reported in Figure 9. Notice that the mean of this ratio is close to 3.5, but it may take
larger value. This simple example illustrates how important may be the impact on the capital
charge computed with an internal model when facing a relatively big loss.
Figure 9: Density of the ratio CaR∗ /CaR
4 Implications for regulators and the investment industry
At ﬁrst glance, it seems the extent of the Madoff aﬀair calls inevitably for new regulations
guaranteeing hedge funds' investors better information on their investments. Already the calls
for higher disclosure requirements on the part of hedge fund managers about their operational
and, possibly also, their investment processes have gained in strength and in validity and, perhaps
grudgingly, in support. While we certainly agree that it is a desirable end  at least for investors
 one must question what impact such measures would truly have, especially in the case of
interest to us: funds of hedge funds (FoHF) managers and similar professional investors. Indeed,
one can be surprised at the mention of the enormous amounts lost by professional experts in
Madoff's scheme9.
9Among the losers, the eight biggest, all professional investors, lost more than $1 billion each to Madoff's
scheme (cf. http://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/st_madoff_victims_20081215.html), and the list
of professional investors having lost hundreds of millions is unfortunately and surprisingly long.
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While the stunning features of this aﬀair have already left a mark on the image of hedge
funds, and will possibly have signiﬁcant regulatory consequences for the industry, in terms of
management of the risk borne by HF investors, the ﬁnancial crisis and the hedge fund crisis
that ensued also bring forth relevant issues. Among them, some of the more salient pertain to
the due diligence process as it is the single most important part of the investment process [26].
In truth, it is profoundly disturbing that retail investors could have been impacted by Madoff
(albeit often through means of complex investment schemes) whereas they are normally barred
from investing in such funds, and while there were ways to surmise Madoff's true nature and
that for a decade [34]. We hasten to add that it is not our goal to point out the failings of some
individuals while we comfortably take advantage of the beneﬁt of hindsight. To the contrary,
what we pursue here is the identiﬁcation of the features of the due diligence process that could
be improved, and make propositions. Thus, after having examined in the sections above the
mechanism of Madoff scheme, the reasons that lead to its demise and the lessons which must
be drawn from it in terms of operational risk capital requirements, we now want to look at
the implications the Madoff aﬀair will have on regulators and on the investment industry. We
proceed in this section by looking ﬁrst at the due diligence process and the components which
may need rethinking. Second, we discuss the future of hedge funds, before turning to notions of
deregulation, supervision and coordination.
4.1 Rethinking due diligence processes
Hedge fund due diligence is the process of monitoring and reviewing the operation and manage-
ment of hedge fund managers with the objective of identifying managers with whom to invest,
and, later, monitoring those managers in order to insure alignment with the investors' interests
[8, 43]. One can further distinguish between operational and ﬁnancial due diligence, each pro-
cess designed to monitor the corresponding risk item of investing with a particular manager.
Although due diligence is recognized by professional associations as a best practice, on a global
basis, there is no legal requirement even for professional investors to perform due diligence before
any investment in a particular hedge fund [40, p. 23]. It is only recently that the suggestion has
been made to include the process in a regulatory framework [39].
By nature, due diligence is part of a fund of hedge funds (FoHF) manager's value proposition
[26, p. 57]. Thus, although no global legal framework requires due diligence10, the process
is nevertheless often carried out by professional managers and advisors. Despite the fact that
best practices have lately been charted through consultation of the industry and resulted in a
tentative to set standards (cf. [25]) or promote legislation (cf. [39]), no deﬁnite set of guidelines
or rules yet exists to perform a thorough due diligence11. In light of the roughly 40% of the
HF industry constituted of funds of hedge funds, it is obvious to the authors that due diligence
deserves careful consideration in the aftermath of the Madoff scandal and the failure of part of
the industry to detect the enormous operational risk it represented. Moreover, operational due
diligence has been found to be a signiﬁcant source of out-performance for FoHFs [8]. Thus, we
believe that a careful discussion would be beneﬁcial for the industry as well.
10We have to qualify this point. If no global legal requirement exists, there are nonetheless some local regulations
enforcing the practice with diﬀerent degrees of procedures, among them Hong-Kong, France, Germany and Ireland
[40, p. 24].
11A very helpful tool put together by several organizations representing the industry provides a good overview
of the general framework around hedge fund investors and professionals: http://www.hedgefundmatrix.com/
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One of the diﬃculties behind reaching an agreement on the constitutive elements of a due
diligence process certainly stems from the broad and varied landscape of the hedge fund industry
 as broad and varied as hedge fund investors can be. Nevertheless, a general understanding is
that due diligence is labor intensive and more art than science [26, p. 42]. The due diligence
process should be comprised of two legs: a qualitative and a quantitative investigation, and should
assess both operational and ﬁnancial risks for the investors. Although one will probably not ﬁnd
it mentioned anywhere, there exists an implicit double dichotomy, qualitative/quantitative vs.
operational/ﬁnancial risks, possibly because of the inherent diﬃculty of assessing quantitatively
the operational risk and the widespread use of quantitative measures such as Sharpe ratios,
maximum drawdown, etc. to assess ﬁnancial risks. The qualitative part of the due diligence
process often comprises of a thorough investigation of the background of the employees of the
fund, including their qualiﬁcations, experience, criminal records, and anything that could indicate
past misconduct. The structure of the fund is also investigated, where accent is put on potential
conﬂicts of interest, and procedures to handle orders, trades, or risk management. Thorough due
diligence often includes at least an on-site visit per year to the manager to assess ﬁrst-hand the
hedge fund operations.
In truth, the role of quantitative assessment is often played down in regard of the common
disclaimer past performance is not indicative of future results (cf. [26, p. 57]) . Certainly,
this is common sense. Yet, if there is one thing that the Madoff aﬀair and quantitative analysis
exemplify (cf. Appendix A), it is that past performance could be indicative of past misdoings.
And, while the Madoff scandal illustrates well how both ﬁnancial and operational risks are
connected, it is primarily for investors, as discussed above, a case of operational risk realization.
One dimension in the due diligence process which therefore needs re-thinking is the role of
quantitative assessment. For sure, the role of the qualitative part is as relevant now as it was
before, and the standards of disclosure put forth (in particular [1] and [25]) provide a strong
basis on which to judge of the soundness of hedge funds. Yet, the case of LuxAlpha Sicav, one
of Madoff's feeders settled in Luxembourg, and thus subject to European regulation, perhaps
demonstrates that compliance with regulations and disclosure standards are no guarantee against
operational risk for investors. Our point is less that current practice has weaknesses, for there
is no perfect risk detection process. Rather, it is that quantitative analysis could have detected
early on the fraud12 and that we must make sure that the next Madoff-like scheme is detected
and caught in its early stages.
Quantitative measures, in particular of the kind proposed by [31, 12, 21], may help cast light
on suspicious funds. Nonetheless, we cannot claim that quantitative analysis is the panacea to
these problems. First, as explained by Lo and colleagues, there are valid reasons to obtain unusual
values for each of those statistics. Second, certainly, quantitative methods are not armored
against bubbles of exuberant overconﬁdence in the wake of a miraculous Madoff  bubbles
which were almost certainly fed by the man's reputation, and so far record. The Madoff case is
clear evidence of a bias which overtook many investors in whose minds performance overshadows
risks. Against this, no measure can possibly withstand alone. Yet again, the explanation is not
as simple as investors looking the other way. A non negligible number of Madoff's investors
were gullible only because they had limited understanding and experience of complex trading
strategies. This is as certain as the fact that a signiﬁcant number of sophisticated investors did
not buy into Madoff's marketing material. To be fair, the case calls for quantitative analysis
12Indeed, it was [34] as is now widely known, and some in the industry refused to deal with Madoff.
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in the sense of tentative replications and feasibility studies. This type of exercise is similar
in nature to the practice of replicating hedge fund strategies that is found in some hedge fund
clones. As a matter of fact, as demonstrated in Section 2 and Appendix A, only a carefully
conducted replication study of Madoff's strategy would have clearly pointed out the reasons
why it is virtually impossible to produce the type of track records that Madoff's feeder funds
exhibited. Without replication of the strategy, there is no deﬁnite answer. Furthermore, as
Foster and colleagues demonstrated [16], it is impossible to distinguish with a 100% conﬁdence
between outright con artists and reliable managers from their track records.
What is the point, then, one may ask, of such a discussion? We think it necessary to call
for a re-thinking of the due diligence process, and more speciﬁcally to stress on a call to use the
tools provided by the quantitative methods  not as a partisan campaign serving the limited
interests of the quants, but because these considerations have been strangely absent from any of
the regulatory or standardizing framework we have read lately. Indeed, we hope that the Madoff
case will convince any professional investor still doubting of the beneﬁts of conducting thorough
quantitative due diligence, as a risk management tool for one, but also as a marketing product.
Indeed, one may wonder: What did the managers of Madoff's feeder funds actually showed to
the due diligence investigators visiting them about their investment process? Certainly, it was
not a replication study of Madoff's performance.
With this last point, we touch on the central elements of the value proposition of FoHF
managers, and the constituents of most justiﬁcations of their additional services. Indeed, a
sound process of funds selection is two-pronged: thorough due diligence and constant monitoring
of risks. If we insist above on the importance of quantitative assessment for due diligence, one
must not forget that monitoring risks, as well as to some extent portfolios' construction, is hardly
realized without the tools of a quantitative approach. With regard to the Madoff's case, and for
the reasons just cited, one may wonder how any fund of hedge funds invested in the scheme could
monitor and manage their risks but by means of quantitative tools. We hasten to mention that
Madoff's operation had been blacklisted by many asset managers, and many respectable funds of
hedge funds managers, in all likelihood because it could not sustain the scrutiny of quantitative
analysis. Again, our purpose is not to point at the failings of a few but, on the contrary, to
hint at the strong advantages of the quantitative methods, despite their esoteric quality. Our
only conclusion is therefore an advice to investors to stress on more quantitative measures and
processes.
Unfortunately, there is little hope that at ﬁrst the introduction of more quantitative anal-
ysis will provide information understandable and useful to every investors, particularly retail
investors (a key point raised during consultations with the industry [40, p. 26]). But, no positive
change will come without providing better and more accurate information, while protecting the
industry's business  a point already made by Lo when he called almost a decade ago for the
development of better quantitative assessment tools [31]. Furthermore, as emerged during the
consultation process with professionals [40, p. 27], concerning the selection of funds for FoHFs'
portfolios, there is still a debate between a principles-based approach or strict eligibility crite-
ria. Perhaps, the tools of quantitative assessment can provide an escape route by enabling the
compromise between principles-based approach and strict eligibility criteria. For example, one
could think of strict quantitative eligibility criteria of which violation would require managers to
explain in details the reasons regularly.
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4.2 The future of hedge funds
Under the economic duress of 2008, the hedge fund industry as a whole faced its worst year ever
with a yearly loss of 18.30%, while funds of hedge funds alone did a little worst with 19.97%,
according to Hedge Fund Research's HFRI indices. The liquidity crisis also forced investors to
withdraw their investments forcing the industry to redeem enormous amounts of money with total
estimates as high as 50% of the Assets Under Management (AUM) of the entire industry [15].
Other more conservative estimates put the total amount of redemptions around US$382 billion
for the entire industry for the year 2008 [45]. All in all, it is an industry signiﬁcantly smaller than
a year earlier (in terms of AUM)  39% smaller according to [45]  that is now facing the year
2009. Conjointly, there is signiﬁcant talk and pressure on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to
enforce more regulation on hedge funds13. It is diﬃcult to judge with precision where the future
of the hedge fund industry lays exactly. The Madoff aﬀair is only one of many factors threatening
to ignite in a conﬂagration which may or may not destroy the industry but will certainly change
signiﬁcantly its landscape. In this section, we review what we think are the most signiﬁcant of
them, including calls for better transparency and regulation of the industry.
Impact of broad ﬁnancial and economic changes
One cannot imagine the future of hedge funds without considering them in the broader economic
context. The one objective which regulators will likely pursue in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis
is to provide better regulations to preserve future economic and ﬁnancial stability. There are
two possible dimensions in the general regulatory framework whose changes might aﬀect hedge
funds. The ﬁrst pertains to the relationship that hedge funds keep with ﬁnancial institutions as
borrowers, makers of securities transactions and counterparts in derivative trades. New regula-
tion on the risk capital requirements for these institutions will likely have impacts on hedge funds
that are not easy to foresee. Second, and connected with the previous dimension, new regula-
tion on the trading of securities, beyond the current limitations on insider trading, compliance
with anti-takeover laws, and disclosure requirements for large stakes in thinly traded securities,
could seriously change the landscape in which hedge funds operate. Following the debacle of
the subprime crisis and the current ﬁnancial ﬁasco, there will likely be a push toward stricter
regulation and control mechanisms for speciﬁc investment products like credit default swaps,
collateralized-debt obligations and other derivatives. Similarly, trading restrictions, concerning
for example short selling, will probably undergo once again close scrutiny. Part of the incerti-
tude associated with the future of hedge funds is therefore tightly coupled to their situation
in the global ﬁnancial system as advanced sophisticated investment vehicles [32]. As the system
changes, so will the hedge funds adapt. Yet, many outcomes remain unclear.
Any debate on the subject is complicated still by the absence of any in-depth study of the
social costs and beneﬁts to hedge fund trading. There are nonetheless dimensions speciﬁc to the
hedge fund industry which we could examine. Ever since the collapse of LTCM in 1998, there
have been discussions as to whether hedge fund activity increases the systemic risk (cf. [14], [28]
for more detailed discussions of the LTCM collapse; and [43, pp. 24-26] and [32] for a review of
the systemic risk dimensions of the hedge fund industry). While there has been building evidence
of a possible increase of systemic risk due to hedge funds' activities [11, 12, 29], although often
13Cf. e.g., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122627663064812111.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_
investing in the U.S., and http://www.manifesto2009.pes.org/en/debate/post/801 for an example of voices
calling for more regulation in Europe.
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indirect or incidental, the complexity of the issues at hand would undermine any attempt to
discuss them thoroughly in the forum provided by this paper. Still, by appraising the hedge
fund industry by the function it performs rather than the form it takes, there are several broad
predictions which one can make to the possible directions the industry will take.
Transparency and monitorship
As a function, enabled by the increasing use of complex ﬁnancial instruments over the past two
decades, the hedge fund industry has provided an ever larger pool of investors with access to a set
of dynamic nonlinear trading strategies. One can see in the ever increasing amount of AUM in
the past two decades a clear sign that the hedge fund industry oﬀers to its customers a service
not provided by other more regulated investment vehicles, like mutual funds or CTAs (e.g., [31],
[37]). Insofar as this raison d'être remains, the hedge fund industry will not likely disappear. It
is with this in mind that the idea of increasing the transparency of the industry and heightening
the regulation requirements must be examined.
With respect to the idea of mandatory registration of hedge fund managers, Brown and
colleagues, taking advantage of the recent failed attempt14 by the American SEC to enforce
registration of hedge funds [9], investigated this issue in the broader context of general investors
and more speciﬁcally in relation to the operational risk. Their ﬁndings can be summed up in three
points. First, since operational risk indicators are conditionally correlated to conﬂict of interests,
it suggests that greater disclosure of those conﬂicts of interests is of value to investors. Second, as
operational risk indicators are correlated to lower leverage and concentrated ownership, it seems
that a disclosure requirement would be redundant to the lenders and equity investors in hedge
funds. Finally, and conversely to the ﬁrst point, it seems that the existence of operational risk
factors have no ex-post impact on the ﬂow-performance relationship15. It means that investors
either lack the information or do not regard it as material. While the beneﬁts of HF registration
are aligned with protecting the investors' interests, it falls short of providing a safe guard against
dangerous behaviors and their incidental promotion by specious performance proﬁles  Madoff
being a case in point. In other words, registration is only the ﬁrst step to prevent scandals akin
to Madoff's as it provides a ﬁrm handle on who needs monitoring, yet this approach must be
complemented by other mechanisms in order to protect investors.
If the idea of monitorship is certainly attractive, it would require strong and resourceful
regulators in every country where hedge funds are active. Monitoring hedge funds individually
would require that the regulators devote an amount of resources comparable to those of the
industry itself to be eﬃcient. This is hardly sustainable, at least under the form of a systematic
monitoring undertaken by a single agency. Instead, one should try to use market forces both as a
dissemination medium and an enforcement engine behind better transparency standards. Some
authors have argued for the creation of an entity comparable to the U.S. National Transportation
Safety Board for the ﬁnancial system (cf. [21], [12], [11] and [32]) as a ﬁrst step toward better
information dissemination among investors. This institution would be in charge of investigating,
14In 2003 already, the SEC attempted to enforce the registration of a majority of hedge fund managers by
reinterpreting the deﬁnition of 'client' to an investment adviser. The new rule and rule amendments under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 would have required HF managers to register as investment adviser by February
1, 2006 [9]. This attempt was later dismissed by the U.S Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on June
23, 2006.
15The ﬂow-performance relationship is the name given to the nonlinear and positive relationship that exists
between performance of a fund and the amounts invested.
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reporting and archiving the ﬁnancial crashes. Lo [32] also called for adaptive regulations taking as
an example the case of OTC contracts with the establishment of organized markets and clearing
corporations whenever those markets exceeds some predeﬁned thresholds. While these measures
would bring in more transparency to the hedge fund industry by providing a clearer picture of
both the mechanisms that lead to ﬁnancial disasters  note that the institution of a Capital
Market Safety Board seems well indicated to handle the Madoff scandal  or the murky market
of OTC contracts, we believe that there already exist trends in or tangent to the industry that
should be encouraged as they provide a clearer risk picture.
Opposition to increased transparency requirements for hedge funds mainly stems from the
trade secret argument. That is, more transparency is a threat to the competitive edge of
the hedge fund manager. While it may be hard to dismiss the argument, its value is certainly
diminished in view of the cries for simpler and clearer ﬁnance brought by the current general
economic and ﬁnancial disaster from the general public. For this very reason, more regulation
is likely to be inevitable, and perhaps not unbecoming to the situation. In line with what we
argued in the sections above on thorough due diligence, increased transparency could probably
be achieved by imposing a standard of reporting to hedge funds, comprising of a mandatory
registration with disclosure of any conﬂict of interests, and also containing for example, to be
meaningful in any way, enough information for the quantitative replication of the hedge fund's
strategy. The format of such a change would most probably lead to a partial exposition of the
industry's positions and tactical bets.
There are several general remarks one could make about its implications. First as noted in
[26, p. 60], regulation brings normalization, and thus enforce the predictable features of any
organization. One possibility such scenario could lead to is an increased systemic instability in
period of ﬁnancial distress where part of the market bets against the known position of one of
its actors16. Second, as some in the industry noted [40, p. 30], the nature of the hedge fund
investment is to delegate to the skills of the manager rather than constantly monitor, and it is
a valid question to ask whether, in general, investors would be pleased by such an outcome.
Retailization of the industry and standardization pressures
At this point, notwithstanding the variety of hedge fund investors, it may be necessary to classify
these into two groups whose characteristics can help derive further implications for the future
of hedge funds. On the one hand, ﬁduciary investors, acting in the stead of their clients, might
display greater need for transparency as they could be held responsible for the poor or fraudulent
performances of their investments. On the other, non-ﬁduciary investors acting in their own
name and to some extent willing to give out more freedom to hedge fund managers in terms of
operational and ﬁnancial reporting, as long as performances are consistent and reward the risks.
It is important to recognize among hedge fund investors the growing importance during the
last decade of institutional investors seeking alternative to the traditional investments oﬀered to
them. While some investors might be looking for absolute performance, a growing trend is to
invest in hedge fund clones. Considering the poor performance of the replication process, these
16Those situations are known to happen. For example one could cite the one we have seen for banks in the ﬁrst
half of 2008 which were forced to de-lever when the market knew about it, a situation which already happened
to some HFs in Q3 1998 in the wake of LTCM.
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investors are often looking for a risk-proﬁle similar to hedge funds in a perspective of portfolio
optimization.
The retailization of hedge funds [11] ensuing from the bigger role of institutional players
thus increases the pressure for transparency. As such, the progress of hedge fund replication
[41] may lead to de facto standardization of the main hedge fund strategies or categories.
This trend toward index-like products [20] is likely to be supported by its more transparent
allocation methodology and its simpler and cheaper fee structure. Similarly, the advent and
the likely increased popularity of managed account platforms of hedge funds for institutional
investors may force a signiﬁcant part of fund of hedge funds toward more standardized oﬀers.
The main advantage of those platforms is their transparency and the increased liquidity they
oﬀer to their clients. If these platforms have noticeably suﬀered since October 2008, it is likely
because of the very advantages they oﬀer. Investors looking for cash have taken advantage of the
platforms' format to get it quickly rather than through the more tedious process of withdrawing
from traditional hedge funds structure. Once the crisis has passed, the advantages they oﬀer in
terms of risk management will certainly make them very attractive to institutional investors and
private bankers alike.
In a way, these new standards would ﬁll the regulatory gap which exists between hedge
funds and their more regulated competitors, as Oesterle argued for in the past [37]. One main
advantage of standardized products is that, hopefully, with standardization progressively comes
the knowledge and understanding of their advantages and pitfalls. The overall impact of this
trend would be to somewhat deﬂate the bubble of investors who came to hedge fund investments
in search of alternatives to the tedious trend-following behavior of classic investments. The
remnants of investors of the non standard highly risky HF strategies would be constituted of
hard-core non ﬁduciary investors, ideally knowledgeable about the risks of the non standard
strategies, but with full ownership of their investment decisions anyhow.
Noticeably, this possible standardization of a signiﬁcant part of the hedge fund industry
is not incompatible with the adaptive regulation perspective put forth by Lo [32]. Indeed, one
could imagine that the more standardized products are in time cleared and sold in organized
markets. Similarly, as advanced dynamic strategies at the edge of hedge funds become increas-
ingly popular, the pressure for standardization rises. The question remaining of course is will
we set the thresholds for regulatory regulations low enough to control the risks and will that be
enough to tame the systemic risk created by the existence of players too big to fail.
Finally, besides the standardizing pressures on some strategies that have become classic in
the alternative investment world the future of part of the industry is coupled more tightly to the
debate on regulation and begs for further reﬂection. One can further separate this remaining
part of the hedge fund industry into two groups: a group of strategies (e.g., 130/30, Long/Short
Equity, etc.) for which some regulated formats exist already, at least in Europe, and other black-
box strategies more akin to private equity than alternative investment. For the latter, very little
can actually be said on regulation except restricting their access to well-informed and wealthy
investors, and possibly also the number of their investors. Conversely, the debate on the former
group is complicated by preexisting national regulations, their disparity around the globe and
the existence, especially in Europe, of procedures of passporting between national regulations.
We review those issues in more details in the next section.
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4.3 Deregulation, supervision and coordination
Even though some aspects of the future of the hedge fund industry the current crisis and the
Madoff scandal will engender remain undecided, one thing is nonetheless certain. The current
circumstances have spurred the debate on the need for regulations, and the Madoff aﬀair is a case
in point. In this section, we examine the circumstances surrounding the debate, particularly the
dimensions of deregulation, supervision and coordination as we believe the answer cannot simply
be more regulation. If one could argue that the lack of regulations on hedge funds' disclosure
requirement have made it easier for the scheme to develop and prosper for so many years, the
problem is in fact almost certainly more complex. First, as we have alluded to above, all the
consequences of more regulation for hedge funds are not necessarily known or even desirable.
Second, and more important, we have to recognize that regulations already exist, and perhaps
even more noticeable, that the ﬁeld is not leveled on this particular aspect [38].
Deregulation
With the Madoff case though, proponents of deregulation could make the argument that even
some of the strictest regulations were not capable of impeding its development. Indeed, one of
the striking aspects of the organization of Madoff's scheme is the case of the LuxAlpha fund 
one of Madoff's feeder funds  which was created under Luxembourgian regulation regime. As
such, and contrary to the other feeders of Madoff's fund, LuxAlpha is subject to strict regulations
in terms of disclosure, control and risk management. In Luxembourg, contrary to the Cayman or
the British Virgin Islands, the agreement procedures to set up a fund and market it to investors
are far more stringent. In other words, since stringent regulations have failed, in the same place
where other less requiring regulators have failed too, one could ask what is in fact the beneﬁt of
regulation.
We believe however that deregulation is not a direction one should consider. It would in all
likelihood induce in the end too high of an economic and ﬁnancial cost. There is little doubt
that without the existence of regulation many more frauds similar to the Madoff scheme would
exist and perhaps proliferate. Even though situations are not comparable, one can nonetheless
take lessons from the situation of Albania at the beginning of the 1990s where lax regulatory
conditions and weak enforcement agencies allowed the development of a state-wide swindling
scheme that brought the country's economy to its knees. Of course, no regulation is perfect; and
regulations can only help inasmuch as they are enforced. Nevertheless, the occasional failure of
the enforcing agencies should not be seen as proof that regulations are worthless. That is not to
say that current regulations could not beneﬁt from improvement. Certainly, Madoff, as well as
new uncovered scandals, are evidence enough that things can be improved.
Madoff's scheme illustrates in particular the problem of national regulations arbitrage, fund
passporting and the lack of coordination and supervision which exist between markets17. In the
following, we focus speciﬁcally on these issues, and, assuming that the current circumstances will
lead to a major redesign of the regulatory framework, propose tentative solutions.
Supervision
Before we pursue, we need to acknowledge that some national regulations already allow some
regulated investment vehicles to engage in strategies long considered to be uniquely reserved for
17Note that the recent Stanford scandal is another example of this arbitrage between regulations.
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hedge funds. This is the case in Europe for example. We certainly support the adaptation of
regulations to the changing landscape of the industry. This form of convergence between asset
management and hedge fund industries is desirable in the sense that many alternative investment
strategies could certainly beneﬁt to the clients of the more classic asset management industry
without necessarily inducing more risk. Nonetheless, if, as we have argued above, there exist
pressures toward a standardization of part of the oﬀer of the hedge fund industry, we have also
pointed that these pressures are not universal. And, unfortunately, by allowing funds practicing
very diﬀerent strategies, mutual funds and absolute returns hedge funds, to coexist under the
same regulatory format and share risk requirements, it is possible that it increases the risk of
confusion for investors, and thus diminishes the usefulness of the regulatory framework.
Our point here is not to incriminate existing regulatory dispositions, but rather to point that
any tentative to regulate the hedge fund industry should not blur the distinction between classic
asset management and nonlinear dynamic (hedge fund) strategies. Thus, we contend here that
any tentative at supervising the hedge fund industry should accommodate for these standardiza-
tion pressures as well as the need for better investor protection by oﬀering at least two diﬀerent
registered and regulated formats to the classic and the alternative asset management industries.
Contrary to Oesterle [37], we believe that the current regulations of mutual funds should remain
intact (including any recent adjustment that allowed more ﬂexibility to the managers in their
strategy). As an example, in Europe, we understand the UCITS III format as a well suited over-
all for this purpose. On the other hand, regulators should oﬀer to hedge funds a regulated format
sharing the requirements of mutual funds in terms of risk management, deontology, registration,
reporting, valuation, or disclosure of strategies, but allowing for more maneuverability in terms of
leverage, liquidity or invested assets classes. The rationale is two-fold. First, if standardization of
part of the industry is probably an unstoppable trend at this point, it could nevertheless beneﬁt
from, and perhaps be accelerated by, a frame provided by regulators. Second, however, the latter
should keep in mind that the purpose of a regulated HF format should not be to capture the
standardization trend  which by essence needs few harmonizing constraints  but to attract
some non standard strategies in a regulated format amenable to the protection of all investors,
particularly retail investors.
Coordination
The idea of regulations arbitrage is to create a fund in a place where the regulations are rela-
tively lax, and then use existing agreements on the marketing of foreign funds in the more strictly
regulated national markets to attract and commercialize the funds to investors. Note that the
problem is heightened in Europe by the existence of UCITS III. We want to stress on the impor-
tance of harmonizing the formats between regulations, and thus the importance of coordination
between regulators. We hasten to point out that eﬀorts in this direction exist already, in partic-
ular for funds of hedge funds [39] (cf. also http://www.hedgefundmatrix.com/). Furthermore,
beside the need to coordinate the regulatory formats, coordination should also be required in
order to set a clear delineation between regulated and unregulated zones. One major problem
to a fully eﬀective implementation of any regulatory framework is that even if the investment
vehicles are completely regulated because of the existence of ﬁscal paradises the funds' portfolios
may themselves be outside the scope of the regulators. This issue is particularly relevant for
funds of hedge funds. Coordination is therefore key to the promotion of the industry's best
practices, comprising, but not limited to, rigorous due diligence and risk management processes
as we have advocated above.
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The promotion of best practices is in our view perhaps the only way to preserve the purpose
of any new regulation, and even perhaps better in some subject areas than regulation itself.
Indeed, if one sees the purpose of regulation as protecting investors and the general public from
any deviant behaviors, one must also acknowledge that regulations need to be adaptable [32],
particularly in the face of the rapid changes of international ﬁnance. That is to say it is perhaps
possible to regulate every single aspect of the ﬁnancial investment landscape as we know it today.
Yet, the very structural phenomenon which lead to the rise of the hedge fund industry would
only suﬀer a set back rather than be understood and directed as a force toward a better use of
ﬁnancial innovations.
Finally, let's summarize the points we made in this section on deregulation, supervision and
coordination. First of all, one needs to maintain a clear delineation of the diﬀerences between
classic asset management and hedge funds, even though a signiﬁcant part of the hedge fund
industry will likely progress toward more standardized and index-like product oﬀers. Second,
pursuing the creation of two diﬀerent registration formats should on the one hand provide a
regulatory framework to oﬀer to institutional and other ﬁduciary investors the formats they
need to preserve their duties while beneﬁting from some complex strategies; on the other hand,
diminish the attraction of black-boxed strategies by providing transparently to all investors the
access to nonlinear payoﬀs. Wealthy and knowledgeable individual investors should still have
the opportunity however to invest in hedge funds with highly risky strategies  outside of the
regulated formats proposed above  as long as the total size of these strategies do not induce
an increased systemic risk. Coordination is also needed among regulators to ensure that this
delineation between regulated formats remains consistent, as well as to promote the industry's
best practices in terms of due diligence and risk management.
5 Conclusion
The Madoff fraud is exceptional and will presumably have great impacts on the hedge funds
industry's regulation and its risk management processes. A fraud of this extent is so rare that to
prevent other scandals, it is necessary to understand it scientiﬁcally. This was the objective of
this paper. Furthermore, the hedge fund industry has profoundly changed since its ﬁrst major
crisis in 1969, or even the 1998 failure of LTCM. Nowadays, democratization of these investment
vehicles has spread. This phenomenon cannot be ignored. Moreover, beecause of the hedge fund
industry's tight relationship with the economy, and because frauds akin to Madoff's could in a
worst case scenario take down key players, new responses commensurate with the issues at stake
must be sought.
One remarkable trait of the Madoff story is its alleged longevity and more surprisingly the fact
that, without the subprime crisis and its consecutive liquidity default, the fraud would probably
still be ongoing. We tried to understand how Madoff could have supported and sustained his
reputation and how he could have survived in a well regulated environment. We therefore
appealed for improvement of the rules of operational risk management to take into account in
their implementation the peculiarities of asset management and private banking. We also showed
that with quantitative tools, it was possible to detect Madoff's fraud. These tools  essentially
replication tools  could improve due diligence processes.
New responses should also help in the ﬁght against the lack of transparency, which, as we
illustrated in this paper, was one major factor in allowing the development of the Madoff scheme.
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We advocated for the dissemination of best practices in order to increase the chances of survival
of this industry  which despite its shortcomings is essential to the asset management universe.
Another solution we considered would be to increase regulation; but to do so without taking into
account the industry's idiosyncrasies would be inappropriate and likely too expensive. Good
standards exist already  for example, in Europe, UCITS III is a well suited registration format
which probably needs to be completed by other similar formats speciﬁc to hedge funds. Therefore,
to avoid other Madoff-type frauds, we proposed to develop current legislation along two avenues.
First, we promoted the standardization of the hedge fund industry. Had Madoff's strategy
been compared with well known standards, the scheme could possibly have been uncovered
earlier. Second, we proposed to create a new registration format to clarify the industry without
compromising its speciﬁcity. Our approach is motivated by the constatation that unlike previous
scandals  e.g. LTCM which was essentially based on excessive leverages  the Madoff fraud
(and possibly others of the same kind) took advantage of the relative opaqueness which reigns
in the hedge fund industry to attract investors. Hence, regulation should primarily be aimed
at avoiding investors' confusion and providing protection against fraudulent behavior. The new
format we put forth, which would be accessible to a majority of hedge funds  but not to
black-boxes  would bear the same rules of risk management, reporting, disclosure, etc. This,
we hope, should avoid frauds and contagion, and restore the hedge fund industry's image.
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A The bull-spread or `split strike conversion' strategy
A.1 Description of the strategy
Let St be the price of a risky asset. We denote by C (KC) the price of a call option written
on this risky asset with strike KC . P (KP ) is the price of the put option with strike KP . The
bull-spread strategy is composed of three positions
1. a long position on the risky asset St;
2. a short position on the call option C (KC);
3. and a long position on the put option P (KP ) with KP < KC .
We consider a period with two dates 0 and T . The payoﬀ function of this strategy is then
PnL = (ST − S0) +
C (KC)−max (0, ST −KC) +
max (0,KP − ST )− P (KP )
We obtain 3 cases
PnL =

(KP − S0) + C (KC)− P (KP ) if ST ≤ KP
(ST − S0) + C (KC)− P (KP ) if KP < ST < KC
(KC − S0) + C (KC)− P (KP ) if ST ≥ KC
We represented the payoﬀ function18 in Figure 10. Because the payoﬀ functions of the bull
spread strategy and the long only strategy are diﬀerent, their distribution functions may not be
compared (see Figure 11).
18We assumed that S0 = 100. The strikes of the options are respectively KC = 103 and KP = 93. The maturity
T of the options is equal to one year. We considered that the implied volatility Σ is 30%. And we assumed no
dividends and an interest rate equal to 0%.
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Figure 10: Payoﬀ functions of the long only strategy and the bull spread strategy
Figure 11: Cumulative distribution function of the PnL for the long only and bull spread strate-
gies
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A special case of the bull spread is when one completely ﬁnances the buying of the put option
by selling the call. It means that C (KC) = P (KP ). Given a strike KC for the call, you may
also ﬁnd the strike KP which veriﬁes C (KC) = P (Kp), and vice versa. This is done by solving a
non-linear equation. Let CBS (K,Σ, T ) and PBS (K,Σ, T ) be respectively the call and put prices.
We deﬁne KP = κ (KC) as follows
KP = {K : PBS (K,Σ, T ) = CBS (KC ,Σ, T )}
We represented the function KP = κ (KC) for the previous set of parameters (but with a one
month maturity) in Figure 12. Notice that when taking into account the smile, the proﬁles of
the strikes are less favorable to the bull-spread strategy. Indeed, the implied strike for the put
with smile is below the one computed with no smile.
Figure 12: Relationship KP = κ (KC)
A.2 Rationale of the strategy
There are two main arguments (put forth by Madoff) for investing in a bull-spread strategy.
1. The ﬁrst one is that a bull spread strategy will have a larger Sharpe ratio than the long only
strategy, because, even if it produces smaller performance, the volatility will be considerably
lower than the volatility of the long only strategy;
2. The second argument is that we may beneﬁt from the alpha produced by the stock picking
process by writing the options on the index but investing in a basket of stocks instead of
the entire index.
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Let us consider the ﬁrst argument. Assuming that the price of the index follows a geometric
brownian motion,
dSt = µSt dt+ σSt dWt (A-1)
with the previous parameters, µ = 10% and σ = Σ = 30%, we obtain the sharpe ratios19 for
several sets of parameters KC and KP in Table 4. The sharpe ratio of the long only strategy
is obtained when KC → ∞ and KP → 0. It is equal to
(
µ− 12σ2 − r0
)/
σ. Notice that in
this example the bull-spread strategy produces higher Sharpe ratios. However, in real life, the
underlying price is not log-normal. In particular, one can observe a skew in the probability
distribution function of the returns. In the case of the equity market, it is known that positive
returns are certainly more frequent than negative returns. However, the magnitude of negative
returns is generally higher than the one of positive returns. Suppose that the one-year return
rS = lnS1 − lnS0 is given by the following model
rS =
{
µ+ + σ+ε with probability p
µ− + σ−ε with probability q = 1− p (A-2)
with ε ∼ N (0, 1). Computations give us
E [r] = pµ+ + (1− p)µ−
σ2 [r] =
(
p
(
µ2+ + σ
2
+
)
+ (1− p) (µ2− + σ2−))− (pµ+ + (1− p)µ−)2
Stylized facts impose that pÀ q and |µ+| ¿ |µ−|. Knowing the parameters µ and σ of the log-
normal model (A-1), it is easy to calibrate the ﬁve parameters p, µ+, µ−, σ+ and σ− of the skew
model (A-2) by matching the ﬁrst two moments. For example, with µ = 10% and σ = 30%, one
solution is: p = 23 , µ+ = 21.2%, µ− = −25.9%, and σ+ = σ− = 20.2%. With these parameters,
we may compute the Sharpe ratio of the bull-spread strategy. Results are reported in Table 4.
We verify that we obtain the same Sharpe ratio than in the case of the log-normal model since we
have the same ﬁrst two moments. As in the case of log-normal model, the Sharpe ratio increases
when the call and put strikes tends to the initial spot price. But the most important thing is
that Sharpe ratios are bigger in the skew model than in the log-normal model.
Table 4: Sharpe ratio of the bull spread strategy
Sharpe ratio
Model (A-1) Model (A-2) Model (A-3)
KC KP case (1) case (2) case (3)
101 99 0.265 0.328 2.319 0.594 0.290
102 98 0.263 0.325 1.795 0.660 0.310
103 97 0.260 0.322 1.481 0.729 0.330
104 96 0.258 0.319 1.276 0.801 0.351
105 95 0.255 0.316 1.132 0.872 0.371
107 93 0.251 0.310 0.947 1.005 0.411
110 90 0.244 0.300 0.792 1.136 0.470
∞ 0 0.183 0.183 0.350 0.650 0.650
19Computed using logarithmic returns.
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Remark 1 We must be careful with the previous argument because the skew property of the
returns is also taken into account by the smile eﬀect and the cost of put options will therefore be
higher.
The second argument is to write the option position on the index St but to build the linear
position with a basket of stocks Bt. We may for example suppose that one has a stock picking
process which creates alpha, and one wants to use it to improve his or her performance. In this
case, the PnL of the strategy becomes
PnL = (BT −B0) +
C (KC)−max (0, ST −KC) +
max (0,KP − ST )− P (KP )
Let us assume that {
dSt = µSSt dt+ σSSt dWSt
dBt = µBBt dt+ σBBt dWBt
(A-3)
with
〈
WSt ,W
B
t
〉
= ρ dt. We may distinguish between diﬀerent cases
1. if ρ = 1, σB = σS and µB > µS , the stock picking process creates alpha every time because
we have ∀ t2 > t1:
lnBt2 − lnBt1 > lnSt2 − lnSt1
2. if ρ = 1, σB < σS and µB > µS , the stock picking process creates alpha on average with
same observed volatility
E [lnBt2 − lnBt1 ] > E [lnSt2 − lnSt1 ]
var [lnBt2 − lnBt1 ] = var [lnBt2 − lnBt1 ]
3. if ρ < 1, σB < σS and µB > µS , the stock picking process creates alpha on average;
4. if σB > σS and µB < µS , the stock picking process does not create alpha on average.
Consider our previous example and let's illustrate the ﬁrst three cases using the following values
for the parameters: µB = 15%, σB = 30% and ρ = 1 for the case (1), µB = 15%, σB = 20% and
ρ = 1 for the case (2), and µB = 15%, σB = 20% and ρ = 0.85 for the case (3). We reported the
results in Table 4. For case (1), we obtain very high Sharpe ratios especially when the two strikes
are very close. In the second case, we obtain strange results. At ﬁrst, the Sharpe ratio increases
as we move away from the ATM strikes and then decreases. In the third case, the Sharpe ratio
is smaller than the long only strategy. These last two cases are very interesting because the
bull-spread strategy faces correlation risk and volatility risk. Notice also that the PnL of the
bull-spread strategy is now not bounded and the volatility of the PnL is higher. In case (2), we
have a larger dispersion of the PnL which explains that the Sharpe ratio is smaller than case
(1). In case (3), the basket may go up whereas the index may go down (and vice versa). This
correlation risk has a negative impact on the Sharpe ratio.
To conclude, the two arguments used to explain the appealing performance for the bull-spread
strategy provide in fact mitigated results. First, the fact that asset returns are more frequently
positive than negative is good for the strategy, but it also implies a higher cost of the put option.
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Second, even if you are a good stock picker, you may face correlation risk which can be dramatic
for the performance of the strategy. However, if you are able to eliminate this correlation risk,
you may eﬀectively create impressive Sharpe ratios. But, this will mean that you are always
right (in your stock selection) and a simple strategy with a long position on your stock selection
and a short position on the index is enough to create similar results.
B Modeling Ponzi schemes in investment management
Ponzi schemes have been studied in economics principally in the case of sovereign debt [7, 24] or
rational expectations [44, 22, 42]. However, to our knowledge, they have not been formalized in
the case of investment management. In this section, we propose a simpliﬁed model to understand
the mechanism of Ponzi schemes in investment management and to model the default time of
such schemes.
Let Ft and Kt be respectively the value of the investment fund (assets under management)
and the value of the capital at time t. We assume that the return of the capital is rt whereas
the gross return of the fund is denoted by µt. We suppose that we have at time t subscription
and redemption amounts given by K+t and K−t . The dynamics of Ft and Kt are then{
dKt = rtKt dt+K+t −K−t
dFt = µtFt dt+K+t −K−t
The ﬁrst equation means there are two components of the capital growth,
1. the ﬁrst component is related to the return on the capital;
2. whereas the second component is composed of jumps corresponding to subscription/re-
demption on the fund.
The dynamic of the value of the fund is similar to the dynamic of the capital except that the
return of the fund is µt. Of course, µt is bigger than rt in order to attract investors. In a ﬁrst
approach, we will assume that subscriptions and redemptions are proportional to the value of
the fund Ft : K+t = λ+t Ft dt and K−t = λ−t Ft dt. λ+t and λ−t may be viewed as instantaneous
intensity rates. With these speciﬁcations, the model becomes{
dKt = rtKt dt+
(
λ+t − λ−t
)
Ft dt
dFt = µtFt dt+
(
λ+t − λ−t
)
Ft dt
(B-4)
with K0 = F0. At the launch date, the assets under management are equal to the capital. The
default τ of the fund is also deﬁned by the ﬁrst hitting time: τ = inf {t > 0 : Kt < 0}. Let
X = (Kt, Ft). We have {
dXt = AtXt dt
X0 = K01
with
At =
(
rt λ
+
t − λ−t
0 µt + λ+t − λ−t
)
A solution is
Xt = K0
(
e
∫ t
0 As ds
)
1 (B-5)
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In the case where the parameters rt, µt, λ+t and λ−t are constant, the solution reduces to Xt =
K0
(
eAt
)
1. The behavior of τ is related to the eigenvalues of the A matrix. In particular, it
is obvious to show that the fund does not default if the subscription rate is greater than the
redemption rate: λ+ > λ−. Otherwise, the fund may collapse because the cash outﬂows are
bigger than the capital appreciation (or cash inﬂows).
Let us consider an example with rt = 5%, µt = 10%, λ+t = 5% and λ−t = 0.02× 1{t<5}+ λ×
1{t≥5} The rates of return on capital and of the fund are respectively 5% and 10% per year. The
inﬂows rate is 5% per year whereas we assume that the redemptions are time-varying. During
the ﬁrst 5 years, the outﬂows rate is equal to 2% by year. After 5 years, we assume that the
outﬂows rate is constant but bigger than or equal to the inﬂows rate. We consider four cases :
(a) λ = 5%, (b) λ = 11%, (c) λ = 15% and (d) λ = 50%. Results are reported in Figure 13. In
the ﬁrst case (a), the condition λ+t − λ−t > 0 is veriﬁed and the fund does not default. In the
second case, the redemption rate is 11% whereas the subscription rate is 5%. The value of the
fund continue to growth. Nevertheless, the fund defaults after 19 years. In the case (c), both
the assets under management and the capital decrease. The default time is about 15 years. The
case (d) is similar to case (c) but the redemption rate is bigger due for example to a ﬁnancial
crisis or a panic of investors. In this case, the default is quick with only 8 years (that is three
years after the redemption rate went up to λ.
Figure 13: Simulation of the default time τ
The previous model is incomplete however because it does not take into account the fees. The
investors pay to the manager of the fund some fees in order to manage the fund (management
fees) and to perform well (performance fees). If we assume no performance fees, the model
becomes now {
dKt = rtKt dt+
(
λ+t − λ−t
)
Ft dt−mtFt dt
dFt = (µt −mt)Ft dt+
(
λ+t − λ−t
)
Ft dt
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The solution is similar to (B-5) except that the At matrix is now speciﬁed as follows
At =
(
rt λ
+
t − λ−t −mt
0 µt −mt + λ+t − λ−t
)
We see now that even if the net ﬂows are positive  λ+t − λ−t > 0  the fund may default
because the capital is used to pay the manager. Moreover, even if the capital appreciation is
greater than the management fees (rt > mt), the fund may collapse because fees are paid on the
basis of the assets under management. Let us consider the previous example with mt = 2% (see
Figure 14). The fund defaults now even in the case (a). And the default time are all smaller
Figure 14: The impact of management fees
than previously. In reality, the parameters rt, µt, λ+t and λ−t are stochastic. In particular, the
parameter µt must change in order to create noise for the investors. Let us consider the case
(b) with mt = 2% and µt ∼ N (µ, σ) with µ = σ = 10%. We have represented the density of
the default time τ in Figure 15 and reported one simulation run. We verify that assets under
management are not smooth. Indeed, the Ponzi scheme may not be viable if net ﬂows are positive
because of management fees. We may avoid default only if mt < λ+t − λ−t . Otherwise, default is
certain. It is obvious that the default time is a negative function of mt and µt. With higher fees,
you quicken the default because you use more capital to remunerate the manager. In the same
way, if µt is large, AUM grow more quickly and more fees are generated. This fact is illustrated
in Figure 16 with rt = 5%, λ+t = 5% and λ−t = 3%.
C Data
We report in Tables 5, 6 and 7 a description of the six feeder funds which may be found in
Bloomberg.
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Figure 15: Density of the default time τ
Figure 16: Default time with respect to management fees
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